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Commentary/Redish et al.: A unified framework for addiction
judgment in a predictable manner as they commit optical illusions
(Ariely 2008). No such predictability exists, as Redish et al. admit,
with regard to addictions. For instance, most agents are vulnerable to the switch from the loss frame to the gain frame in the
Asian disease experiment (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Also,
most agents fall victim to overconfidence and the conjunction
fallacy (Baron 2008, Ch. 6). But, with addictions, individuals
vary widely in the manner they may or may not become addicted.
The same decision framework seems unable to explain both
biases and addictions. Redish et al.’s framework might not be
the proper tool to explain addictions. Addictions, at first examination, are maladaptive actions in the sense that they reduce O. In
contrast, the errors that arise from heuristics might be minor nuisances that the organism tolerates because the heuristics, on
average, are efficient. In this case, the heuristics are tolerable
“bad habits” given that such habits, in comparison to their
absence, have positive net effect on O. Addictions, in contrast,
totally diminish the ability to produce O. If so, we need
another framework, aside from deliberation and habits, to
tackle addictions. This framework may have to attend to the
urge to be creative, to have a meaningful life, and how it may
lead to addiction when the urge is frustrated.
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Abstract: The model proposed by Redish et al. considers vulnerabilities
within decision systems based on expectancy-value assumptions. Further
understanding of processes leading to addiction can be gained by
considering other inputs to decision-making, particularly affective
associations with behaviors. This consideration suggests additional
decision-making vulnerabilities that might explain addictive behaviors.

Redish et al. show that a fuller understanding of the processes
and outcomes of substance use and abuse can be gained by
probing the underlying decision-making and self-regulatory
mechanisms involved in initiation and maintenance of use.
Their analysis of decision-making systems and vulnerabilities in
those systems stems from expectancy-value model tenets in the
decision-making and behavioral economics literatures, and
from conditioning principles and theories in the learning literature. Although the framework put forward by Redish et al.
draws nicely on these literatures to propose an integrative
model of substance use, there are important processes involved
in decision-making and self-regulation which are not well
included in this framework.
In particular, affective processes are not well represented in
the framework presented in the target article. We know that
affective processes are implicated in a variety of issues around
substance use and abuse. For example, affective states are
reported as antecedents of smoking behavior and of relapses
after quitting (Gilbert et al. 2000; Shiffman et al. 1996). In the
context of alcohol use, negative affect resulting from acts of discrimination is associated with drinking by members of minority
groups (Simons et al. 2006; Terrell et al. 2006). Finally, as
Redish et al. point out, intake of some substances directly leads

450

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4

to affective states (e.g., euphoria; Koob & Le Moal 2006). Moreover, research from multiple domains has shown that affective
processes are an integral part of “normal” decision-making and
both impact and are influenced by the expectancy-value processes discussed in Redish et al.’s analysis. Use of expectedutility rules changes with decision tasks that arouse negative
emotion (Darke et al. 2006; Greene et al. 2001). Behavioral
choices are influenced by anticipation of experiencing regret,
guilt, or other emotions as a result of engaging in a behavior
(Richard et al. 1996).
An integrative model of the influence on behavioral choice of
cognitively based inputs and affective associations with behaviors
has been proposed recently (Kiviniemi et al. 2007). The behavioral affective associations model focuses on affective associations with a behavior – feelings and emotions associated with
a particular behavioral practice. The model proposes that affective associations with a behavior influence actual behavior;
more positive affective associations lead to a greater likelihood
of engaging in a behavior. Moreover, according to the model,
affective associations mediate influences of cognitive beliefs on
behavior. Finally, the model argues that affective associations
influence behavioral practices both via mediating cognitive
beliefs and through a path that is dissociable from and distinct
from the mediation of cognitive beliefs (see Kiviniemi & Bevins
2007 for additional discussion of the model). Affective associations have been documented for alcohol and marijuana use
(Simons & Carey 1998) and smoking (Trafimow & Sheeran
1998). Recent data from the Kiviniemi lab shows that affective
associations both directly predict use behavior and mediate the
influence of expected utility beliefs on use for alcohol, cigarette
smoking, and marijuana use.
Thus, there are a variety of reasons to argue that affective
associations play a central role in both decision-making about
and ongoing self-regulation of substance use. What implications
might an affective association analysis have for Redish et al.’s framework for studying addiction? First, consider two components
of Kiviniemi et al.’s (2007) behavioral affective associations
model: (a) affective associations mediate the influence of expected
utility beliefs on behavior, and (b) affective associations influence
behavior both in conjunction with (through the mediational
pathway) and independent of cognitively based expected utility
beliefs. The mediational path suggests that affective associations
may serve a self-regulatory role by functioning as an indicator of
the expected utility of a behavioral choice or, more broadly, by
indicating the overall positivity or negativity of one’s cognitively
based beliefs (e.g., attitudes, social norms). This would allow
decision making to proceed in a faster and more efficient
manner than directly accessing cognitive beliefs. Such an analysis
is consistent with the work of Damasio and colleagues on the
somatic marker hypothesis (e.g., Damasio 1994). The tenet that
affective associations can exist and can influence behavior independent of one’s cognitive beliefs suggests that the content of
one’s affective associations with a behavior could conflict with
one’s cognitive beliefs (e.g., one might perceive a number of negative consequences from alcohol use but still have overall positive
affective associations with alcohol and its use).
In the context of substance abuse, this suggests the possibility
for an additional vulnerability in the decision-making system. To
the extent that affective associations are created relatively independently of one’s cognitive beliefs about the behavior (as
might be the case for euphoria resulting from use or from associating the drug and its use with other positively valued things), the
independent affective associations – behavior pathway might
push behavior in different directions than the cognitive beliefs
path. Such a conflict between decision-making inputs then
raises the important question of which input will “win” and influence behavior. Because cognitively based processes often require
some effort by the individual, whereas affective processes are
more automatic, it may be the case that affective associations
will be more likely to guide behavior. This may be especially
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likely in the context of substance use where impaired cognitive
functioning may be a consequence of use (e.g., Hoffman et al.
2006; Kim et al. 2005).
Supporting this point about vulnerability and affective associations are the published examples of unconditioned stimulus revaluation using Pavlovian conditioning with alcohol (Molina et al.
1996; Revusky et al. 1980; Samson et al. 2004). For instance, in a
retrospective revaluation design Molina et al. (1996) found that
an aversion to a tactile stimulus conditioned with ethanol was abolished if ethanol was later paired with sucrose. More specifically, rat
pups first had an aversion conditioned to the tactile stimulus by
pairing it with intragastrically administered ethanol. If rat pups
then had the ethanol paired with a sucrose solution via intra-oral
cannula, the robust tactile aversion was no longer expressed. The
previously acquired tactile aversion was not lost if ethanol and
sucrose were presented in an unpaired fashion (i.e., no temporal
contiguity). Molina et al. concluded that the representation of
the ethanol unconditioned stimulus (US) was changed by the appetitive conditioning history with sucrose. As such, expression of the
earlier conditioned association (memory) was also changed. A
similar possibility has been discussed for nicotine (Bevins, in
press; Bevins & Palmatier 2004). Applied to the early discussion,
here is an example of a choice behavior (avoid aversive stimulus)
that was modified not by direct and contrary learning history in
that situation. Rather, choice was presumably altered by changing
the positive affective qualities of ethanol. Perhaps effortful cognition was involved in this revaluation. However, such an assumption
is not necessary to explain the change in choice behavior and, in
fact, seems a priori.
In summary, Redish et al. in this target article outline an integrative model of substance use from a decision-making and selfregulation perspective. This model provides much to think about,
as well as indicates interesting and likely important paths for
future research. However, we suggest that going beyond considering vulnerabilities within an expectancy-value decision system
to consider how other inputs to decision-making might inform
our understanding of substance use and abuse, can strengthen
the framework proposed by Redish et al. In particular, considering the role of affective associations with behavior suggests that
an additional decision-making vulnerability influencing substance use might be conflict between affectively based and cognitively based decision systems. Such conflict can explain why
behaviors, including substance use and abuse, may depart from
expected-utility model predictions.
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Abstract: Decision-making is a complex activity for which emotions and
affects are essential. Maladaptive choices depend on negative affects.
Vulnerabilities to drug or non-drug objects depend on previous
psychopathological comorbidities. Premorbid individual characteristics
allow us to understand why some individuals – and not others – enter
into the addiction cycle. Moreover, plasticity of reward neurocircuitry
is, at least in past, responsible for these vulnerabilities leading to
compulsive drug use.

The field of addiction research is becoming more and more
complex, and many hypotheses have been proposed to account
for the transition from recreational use to impulsive consumption
and to the last stage of this chronic, relapsing disease: compulsive
use and addiction. Redish et al. have reviewed some of these theories and have proposed a classification under eight categories in
such a way that some researchers will be surprised to find themselves listed under this or that category. The theories cited each
stress different aspects, functional or neuropsychological, and
different phase of the process, or consider either physiological
mechanisms or structural neurobiology. In the target article,
Redish et al. propose one more theory, which is more specific
and cognitively oriented: the process of decision (decisionmaking) is hypothesized to be a “unified framework for addiction”
and to be operational to provide a classification of potential vulnerabilities. From a Herculean analysis of the literature, but from
this restricted point of view, they have identified ten potential
different constitutive vulnerabilities.
Scientific analysts alert us about the breaking down and fragmentation of knowledge, a crisis due in part to the reductionism inherent
in modern scientific progress. What is needed is to turn toward a
more difficult task: to try and propose holistic theories and to
conform to the principle of parsimony. Entities should not be multiplied without necessities, according to the principle of Occam’s
razor. Moreover, most authors now agree about the reality of a
common clinical syndrome for all the drug and non-drug addictions
(Goodman 1990; 2008) and, underlying it, a common set of neuronal systems, whose dysregulations is supposed to be responsible
for the set of symptoms (see Koob & Le Moal 1997; 2001; 2006).
The question is to know at which stage the process is examined. It
seems that Redish et al. are considering the stage of addiction
when maladaptive choices are made in spite of their deleterious
consequences, whereas vulnerability is generally studied as an
intrinsic factor operating at the beginning of the process, accounting
for the huge individual differences in the propensity to move toward
impulsive drug-taking or gambling (Anthony et al. 1994; Piazza &
Le Moal 1996; Piazza et al. 1989; Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration 2003).
At one moment of the process, there is a passage from impulsive control disorder to compulsive disorder – from a stage
where increasing tension and arousal occur before the impulsive act, with pleasure, gratification, or relief during the act, followed by regret or guilt, to a stage of recurrent and persistent
thoughts (obsessions) that cause marked anxiety and stress followed by repetitive behaviors (compulsions) that are aimed at
preventing or reducing distress. The first stage is most closely
associated with positive reinforcement (pleasure, gratification);
the compulsive stage is most closely associated with negative
reinforcement and relief of anxiety and/or stress (Koob & Le
Moal 1997). Addiction involves persistent plasticity in the
activity of neuronal circuits mediating a decreased function of
the brain reward system and a recruitment of anti-reward
systems, now well identified, driving aversive states (Koob &
Le Moal 2005; 2008). For the purpose of this commentary,
the withdrawal/negative affect stage can be defined as the presence of motivational signs of withdrawal in humans, that is,
chronic instability, emotional pain, malaise, dysphoria, and
loss of motivation for natural rewards. As dependence and
withdrawal develop, brain anti-reward systems are recruited
(Koob & Le Moal 2008). Another critical problem is chronic
relapse in which addicts return to compulsive drug-taking
after acute withdrawal; relapse corresponds to the preoccupation/anticipation stage of the addiction cycle just outlined. A
unified framework for addiction cannot avoid the fact, well
documented from clinical observations, that affects and
emotions are important, if not central, neuropsychological
dimensions in this human condition. Needless to say, these
dimensions interact with the process of decision-making.
All the neurobiological theories of addiction (we refer to the
last stage of the process) agree (see Koob & Le Moal 2006)
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